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Abstract
We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of
items both in the case where items are goods (posi-
tive utility) and when they are chores (negative util-
ity). We show that fair allocations of goods and
chores have some fundamental connections but dif-
ferences as well. We prove that like in the case
for goods, an MmS allocation does not need to
exist for chores and computing an MmS alloca-
tion - if it exists - is strongly NP-hard. In view
of these non-existence and complexity results, we
present a polynomial-time 2-approximation algo-
rithm for MmS fairness for chores. We then intro-
duce a new fairness concept called optimal MmS
that represents the best possible allocation in terms
of MmS that is guaranteed to exist. For both goods
and chores, we use connections to parallel machine
scheduling to give (1) an exponential-time exact al-
gorithm and (2) a polynomial-time approximation
scheme for computing an optimal MmS allocation
when the number of agents is fixed.
1 Introduction
The fair allocation of indivisible items is a central
problem in economics, computer science, and opera-
tions research [Aziz et al., 2015; Brams and Taylor, 1996;
Bouveret et al., 2015; Lipton et al., 2004]. We focus on the
setting in which we have a set of N agents and a set of items
with each agent expressing utilities over the items. The goal
is to allocate the items among the agents in a fair manner
without allowing transfer of money. If all agents have posi-
tive utilities for the items, we view the items as goods. On the
other hand, if all agents have negative utilities for the items,
we can view the items as chores. Throughout, we assume that
all agents’ utilities over items are additive.
In order to identify fair allocations, one needs to for-
malize what fairness means. A compelling fairness concept
called Max-min Share (MmS) was recently introduced which
is weaker than traditional fairness concepts such as envy-
freeness and proportionality [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre, 2014;
Budish, 2011]. An agent’s MmS is the “most preferred bundle
he could guarantee himself as a divider in divide-and-choose
against adversarial opponents” [Budish, 2011]. The main idea
is that an agent partitions the items into N sets in a way that
maximizes the utility of the least preferred set in the partition.
The utility of the least preferred set is called the MmS guaran-
tee of the agent. An allocation satisfies MmS fairness if each
agent gets at least as much utility as her MmS guarantee. We
refer to such an allocation as MmS allocation.1
Although MmS is a highly attractive fairness
concept and a natural weakening of proportional-
ity and envy-freeness [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre, 2014;
Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre, 2015], Procaccia and Wang [2014]
showed that an MmS allocation of goods does not exist
in general. This fact initiated research on approximate
MmS allocations of goods in which each agents gets
some fraction of her MmS guarantee. On the positive
side, not only do MmS allocations of goods exist for
most instances [Kurokawa et al., 2016], but there also
exists a polynomial-time algorithm that returns a 2/3-
approximate MmS allocation [Procaccia and Wang, 2014;
Amanatidis et al., 2015]. Algorithms for computing MmS
allocations of goods have been deployed and are being used
for fair division [Goldman and Procaccia, 2014].
In this paper, we turn to MmS allocations for chores, a
subject which has not been studied previously. Even in the
more general domain of fair allocation, there is a paucity
of research on chore allocation compared to goods de-
spite there being many settings where we have chores not
goods [Caragiannis et al., 2012]. In general, the problem of
chore allocation cannot be transformed into a problem for
goods allocation [Peterson and Su, 1998].
Contributions We consider MmS allocation of chores for
the first time and present some fundamental connections be-
tween MmS allocation of goods and chores especially when
the positive utilities of the agents in the case of goods are
negated to obtain a chores setting. We also show that there
are differences between the two settings with no known re-
ductions between the settings. In particular, reductions such
as negating the utility values and applying an algorithm for
one setting does not give an algorithm for other setting.
We show that an MmS allocation does not need to exist for
chores. In view of the non-existence results, we introduce a
1Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre, 2014] and
Budish [Budish, 2011] also formalized a fairness concept called
min-Max fairness that is stronger than Max-min fairness.
new concept called optimal MmS for both goods and chores.
An allocation is an optimal MmS allocation if it represents
the best possible approximation of the MmS guarantee. An
optimal MmS allocation has two desirable properties: (1) it
always exists and (2) it satisfies MmS fairness whenever an
MmS allocation exists (see Figure 1). Consequently, optimal
MmS is a compelling fairness concept and a conceptual con-
tribution of the paper.
We present bounds to quantify the gap between optimal
MmS fairness and MmS fairness. For chores, we present a
linear-time round-robin algorithm for this purpose that pro-
vides a 2-approximation for MmS. We show that the bound
proved is tight for the round robin algorithm. We also show
that, as in the case of goods, the computation of an MmS
allocation for chores is strongly NP-hard and so is the com-
putation of an optimal MmS allocation.
In view of the computational hardness results, we de-
velop approximation algorithms for optimal MmS fair-
ness. For both goods and chores, we use connections to
parallel machine scheduling and some well established
scheduling algorithms to derive an exponential-time ex-
act algorithm and a PTAS (polynomial-time approxima-
tion scheme) when the number of agents is fixed. These
are the first PTAS results related to MMS. As long as an
MMS allocation exists (that does exist in most instances
as shown analytically by Kurokawa et al. [2016] and ex-
perimentally by Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [2014]), our algo-
rithm for goods also provides a PTAS for standard MMS
which in terms of approximation factor is a significant im-
provement over previous constant-factor approximation re-
sults [Procaccia and Wang, 2014].
Max-min share (MmS)
optimal max-min share (Opt mMS) min-Max share (mMS)
Figure 1: Relations between fairness concepts. mMS fairness
implies MmS fairness. Optimal MmS fairness implies MmS
fairness if an MmS allocation exists.
2 Related Work
In addition to the literature on MmS allocations for goods
discussed in the introduction, our work is based on paral-
lel machine scheduling theory. There is a natural connection
between MmS allocations and parallel machine scheduling,
which we outline later. This connection turns out to be very
fruitful for both exact and approximate computations of op-
timal MmS allocations. We briefly introduce the concept of
parallel machine scheduling in the following.
We have a setM of jobs and a set [N ] ofN machines. Each
of the jobs has to be processed exactly once on exactly one
machine without preemption. Furthermore, we have a pro-
cessing time matrix P = (pij)i,j where pij ≥ 0 indicates
how long machine i requires to finish job j. If there are no
further restrictions on the values of P , we deal with unrelated
parallel machines. If pij = pi′j for all i, i′ ∈ [N ] and j ∈ M
then machines are considered identical.
The goal of each machine scheduling problem is to find a
schedule (i.e., an ordered allocation) that optimizes a certain
objective function. The problems that we focus on in this pa-
per either minimize the time where the latest machine finishes
(this is also called the makespan of a schedule) or maximize
the time where the earliest machine finishes. We show that
the former objective is related to MmS allocation of chores
whereas the latter is related to Mms allocation of goods.
An extensive overview on all important machine scheduling
problems is provided by Pinedo [2012].
Graham et al. [1979] established a notation for ma-
chine scheduling problems where P stands for identical
machines, R for unrelated machines, Cmax for minimiz-
ing the latest machine’s finishing time, and Cmin for
maximizing the earliest machine’s finishing time. Accord-
ing to this notation, we will use the problems P/Cmax,
R/Cmax, P/Cmin, and R/Cmin in this paper. The latter
problem is also equivalent to maximizing egalitarian wel-
fare under additive utilities [Asadpour and Saberi, 2010;
Bansal and Sviridenko, 2006]. All of these problems
are NP-hard in the strong sense but they are well
investigated and plenty of research has been con-
ducted on approximation algorithms which we will
take advantage of [Efraimidis and Spirakis, 2006;
Hochbaum and Shmoys, 1987; Lenstra et al., 1990;
Woeginger, 1997].
3 Definitions
We introduce the basic notation and definitions for our ap-
proach in this section. For a set of items M and a number
N ∈ N, let ΠN (M) be the set of all N -partitions of M (i.e.,
item allocations) and let P(M) denote the power set of M.
Definition 3.1. 1. A non-negative instance is a tuple
(M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) consisting of a set of itemsM, a set
[N ] of N agents, and a family of additive utility func-
tions (ui : P(M) → R≥0)i∈[N ]. The set of all non-
negative instances is denoted by I+.
2. A non-positive instance is a tuple (M, [N ], (di)i∈[N ])
consisting of a set of items M, a set [N ] of N agents,
and a family of additive utility functions (di : P(M)→
R≤0)i∈[N ]. The set of all non-positive instances is de-
noted by I−.
3. An instance is a tuple (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) which is a
non-negative instance or a non-positive instance. The set
of all instances is denoted by I.
Definition 3.2. For an instance I = (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) ∈
I, we define the corresponding instance by
−I := (M, [N ], (−vi)i∈[N ]) ∈ I.
Definition 3.3. Let I = (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) ∈ I be an in-
stance and i ∈ [N ] be an agent.
1. Agent i’s Max-min Share (MmS) guarantee for I is de-
fined as
MmSNvi (M) := max(S1,...,SN )∈ΠN (M)
min
j∈[N ]
vi(Sj).
2. Agent i’s min-Max Share (mMS) guarantee for I is de-
fined as
mMSNvi (M) := min(S1,...,SN )∈ΠN (M)
max
j∈[N ]
vi(Sj).
Definition 3.4. Let I = (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) ∈ I be an in-
stance and S = (S1, . . . , SN) ∈ ΠN (M) be an allocation.
1. S is called an MmS allocation for I iff vi(Si) ≥
MmSNvi (M) for all agents i ∈ [N ].
2. S is called a perverse mMS allocation for I iff vi(Si) ≤
mMSNvi (M) for all agents i ∈ [N ].
The concept of a perverse mMS allocation seems counter-
intuitive but turns out to be helpful to obtain results on MmS
allocations for chores.
We can also relax the MmS fairness concept as follows.
Definition 3.5. Given an instance I = (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) ∈
I and a constant λ ∈ R.
1. The λ-max-min problem for I is about finding an al-
location (S1, . . . , SN ) ∈ ΠN (M) with vi(Si) ≥ λ ·
MmSNvi (M) for all i ∈ [N ].
2. The perverse λ-min-max problem for I is about finding
an allocation (S1, . . . , SN) ∈ ΠN (M) with vi(Si) ≤
λ ·mMSNvi (M) for all i ∈ [N ].
4 Properties of MmS Fairness
First, we present a fundamental connection between the al-
location of chores (non-positive utilities) and goods (non-
negative utilities). Later in this section, we discuss non-
existence examples for MmS allocations and show that exis-
tence and non-existence examples do not transfer straightfor-
wardly from goods to chores and vice-versa. Finally, we give
a complexity result for the computation of MmS allocations
for both goods and chores.
4.1 Fundamental Connection between Allocations
of Goods and Chores
The following result shows an interesting connection between
MmS and mMS when changing signs in all utility functions.
Lemma 4.1. Let (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) ∈ I be an instance.
Then we have−MmSNvi (M) = mMS
N
−vi(M) for all agents
i ∈ [N ].
This leads us to the following result discussing the equiva-
lence of MmS allocations for an instance and perverse mMS
allocations for its corresponding instance.
Proposition 4.2. Let I = (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) ∈ I be an
instance and let S = (S1, . . . , SN) ∈ ΠN (M) be an alloca-
tion.
1. S is an MmS allocation for I if and only if S is a per-
verse mMS allocation for the corresponding instance
−I .
2. In particular, there is an MmS allocation for I if and
only if there is a perverse mMS allocation for the corre-
sponding instance −I .
Proof. For all i ∈ [N ], we have vi(Si) ≥ MmSNvi (M) ⇔
−vi(Si) ≤ −MmSNvi (M)
4.1
⇔ −vi(Si) ≤ mMSN−vi(M).
which proves both claims.
This fundamental connection shows also a difference be-
tween the allocation of chores and goods since finding MmS
allocations and finding perverse mMS allocations involve dif-
ferent objectives.
A similar statement can be made for the approximations.
Proposition 4.3. Let I = (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) ∈ I be an
instance and let S = (S1, . . . , SN) ∈ ΠN (M) be an allo-
cation. Let λ ∈ R be arbitrary. Then S is a solution of the
λ-MmS problem for I if and only if S is a solution of the per-
verse λ-mMS problem for the corresponding instance −I .
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Prop. 4.2 with
just an additional factor λ on the right side of each inequality.
4.2 Non-existence and Complexity of MmS
Procaccia and Wang [2014] showed that an MmS allocation
for goods does not necessarily exist. We construct an instance
I = (M, [3], (ui)i∈[3]) ∈ I
+ by a subtle modification of their
example to obtain an analogous result for chores. Consider a
set [3] = {1, 2, 3} of three agents and a set of twelve items
(represented by pairs)
M = {(j, k)|j = 1, 2, 3; k = 1, 2, 3, 4}.
We define matrices
B =
(
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
)
, O =
(
17 25 12 1
2 22 3 28
11 0 21 23
)
,
E1 =
(
−3 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
)
, E2 =
(
−3 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
)
,
E3 =
(
−3 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
)
.
For each agent i ∈ [3], we define her utility function by
ui :M→ R≥0, (j, k) 7→ 10
6 · Bjk + 10
3 ·Ojk + E
i
jk.
We obtain the following result by a careful adaption of the
argument presented by Procaccia and Wang [2014].
Proposition 4.4. There is no MmS allocation for−I . In par-
ticular, an MmS allocation for chores does not need to exist.
Another interesting difference between MmS for goods
and chores is the fact that existence and non-existence ex-
amples for MmS allocations cannot be simply converted into
each other by just changing the signs of the utility functions.
The only difference from I to the instance of the example
presented by Procaccia and Wang [2014] are changed signs
in the Ei matrices. Let J = (M, [3], (wi)i∈[3]) ∈ I+ denote
their instance. We get the following interesting result.
Proposition 4.5. There is an MmS allocation for I but no
MmS allocation for −I . There is no MmS allocation for J
but an MmS allocation for −J .
Not only do MmS allocations not exist in general, comput-
ing an MmS allocation is strongly NP-hard if it exists. The
reduction is straight forward from Integer Partition to an allo-
cation instance in which each agent has the same utility func-
tion.2
Proposition 4.6. For both goods and chores, computing an
MmS allocation - if it exists - is strongly NP-hard. The prob-
lem is weakly NP-hard even for two agents.
5 2-Approximation for MmS for Chores
The purpose of this section is to present a polynomial-time
2-approximation algorithm for MmS for chores. Each agent
is guaranted at most twice her (non-positive) max-min share
guarantee.
Through the entire section, let I = (M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) ∈
I+ be a non-negative instance. We define uimax :=
maxj∈M ui(j) for all i ∈ [N ]
If we are given a chores instance −I , we run a round robin
protocol in which in which agents come in round robin man-
ner and are given a most preferred available item. Framed in
terms of insance I , we consider the round-robin protocol in
which agents come in round robin manner and are given an
available item with the lowest utility.
Lemma 5.1. Let (S1, . . . , SN ) ∈ ΠN (M) be the allocation
obtained by the round-robin greedy protocol for I . Then we
have ui(Si) ≤ ui(Si′) + uimax for all agents i, i′ ∈ [N ].
Proof. The result is trivial for i = i′. If i < i′, i.e., i always
chooses before i′, then the result is also obvious because iwill
choose her lowest valued item in every round and has to pick
at most one item more than i′ in total (which is compensated
by uimax).
Therefore, we can assume that i > i′, i.e., i′ picks before i
in every round. The protocol has exactly K = ⌈ |M|
N
⌉ rounds.
The pick of agent i (i′ resp.) in round k is denoted by rik ∈M
(ri′k ∈M resp.). We have
ui(Si′ )− ui(Si) =
K∑
k=1
ui(r
i′
k )− ui(r
i
k)
= ui(r
i′
1 )− ui(r
i
1) + ui(r
i′
2 )− ui(r
i
2) + . . .
. . .+ ui(r
i′
K−1)− ui(r
i
K−1) + ui(r
i′
K)− ui(r
i
K)
We separate two cases. In the case that agent i′ has to pick
an item in the last round, we have ui(rik) ≤ ui(ri
′
k+1) for
all k = 1, . . . ,K − 1 (picking rule) and therefore ui(Si′) −
ui(Si) ≥ ui(ri
′
1 ) − ui(r
i
K). In the other case where agent i′
does not have to pick anymore in the last round, agent i also
2The complexity result for goods has already been proved by
Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [2014].
does not have to pick since she picks after i′. It follows that
ui(Si′ )− ui(Si) =
K−1∑
k=1
ui(r
i′
k )− ui(r
i
k)
= ui(r
i′
1 )− ui(r
i
1) + ui(r
i′
2 )− ui(r
i
2) + . . .
. . .+ ui(r
i′
K−1)− ui(r
i
K−1)
≥ ui(r
i′
1 )− ui(r
i
K−1)
since ui(rik) ≤ ui(ri
′
k+1) for all k = 1, . . . ,K − 2 (picking
rule).
Combining both cases, this gives us ui(Si) − ui(Si′) ≤
ui(r
i
α) − ui(r
i′
1 ) with α ∈ {K − 1,K} and finally ui(Si)−
ui(Si′) ≤ uimax.
Lemma 5.2. Let (S1, . . . , SN ) ∈ ΠN (M) be the allocation
obtained by the round-robin greedy protocol. Then we have
ui(Si) ≤
1
N
· ui(M) +
(
1−
1
N
)
· uimax
for each agent i ∈ [N ].
Proof. We haveN ·ui(Si)
5.1
≤ ui(Si)+
∑
i6=i′∈[N ] ui(Si′ )+
(N − 1) · uimax = ui(M) + (N − 1) · u
i
max. Division by N
yields the result.
Proposition 5.3. The round-robin greedy allocation protocol
gives an allocation (S1, . . . , SN) ∈ ΠN (M) with
ui(Si) ≤
(
2−
1
N
)
·mMSNui(M)
for all i ∈ [N ]. The inequality cannot be improved for general
instances.
Proof. By definition of the min-max share guarantee and the
additivity of ui, we obtain
1
N
· ui(M) ≤ mMS
N
ui
(M) (1)
and
uimax ≤ mMS
N
ui
(M) (2)
for all i ∈ [N ].
Then we have ui(Si)
5.2
≤ 1
N
· ui(M) +
(
1− 1
N
)
· uimax
(1)
≤
mMSNui(M)+
(
1− 1
N
)
·uimax
(2)
≤
(
2− 1
N
)
·mMSNui(M) for
each agent i ∈ [N ], which proves the first part of the result.
The bound cannot be improved in general. To show this,
we give an example where the bound is tight. Consider a set
M = (t1, t2, . . . , t(N−1)·N+1) of (N − 1) ·N +1 items. Let
the utility function u be the same for all agents with u(tj) =
1
N
for all j = 1, . . . , (N − 1) ·N and u(t(N−1)·N+1) = 1.
Then we have mMSNu (M) = 1 because we get a (per-
fectly balanced) N -partition by packing N − 1 sets with ex-
actly N of the 1
N
-valued items and a last set consisting just
of the one 1-valued item.
Since u is the same for all agents, the greedy round-
robin algorithm gives agent 1 the allocation S1 =
{t1, tN+1, t2N+1 . . . , t(N−1)N+1} for which
u(S1) = (N−1)·
1
N
+1 = 2−
1
N
=
(
2−
1
N
)
·mMSNu (M)
holds true.
Theorem 5.4. Let I = (M, [N ], (di)i∈[N ]) ∈ I− be a
non-positive instance and denote the round-robin greedy al-
location for −I by (S1, . . . , SN) ∈ ΠN (M). Then we have
di(Si) ≥
(
2− 1
N
)
· MmSNdi (M) for all i ∈ [N ] and the
inequality cannot be improved for general instances.
Proof. Follows immediately from 5.3 with 4.3.
6 Optimal MmS Fairness
Before we can introduce the optimal MmS fairness concept,
we have to define an instance-specific parameter.
Definition 6.1. 1. For a non-negative instance I ∈ I+,
the optimal MmS ratio λI is defined as the maximal
λ ∈ [0,∞] for which the λ-max-min-problem for I has
a solution.
2. For a non-positive instance I ∈ I−, the optimal MmS
ratio λI is defined as the minimal λ ∈ [0,∞) for which
the λ-max-min-problem for I has a solution.
Note that both the maximum and the minimum exist in this
definition since for a fixed instance I , there is only a finite
number of possible allocations. We have the following initial
bounds for the optimal MmS ratio.
Lemma 6.2. 1. Let I = (M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) ∈ I+ be a
non-negative instance. Then we have 23 ≤ λ
I ≤ ∞, with
λI =∞ if and only if MmSNui(M) = 0 for all i ∈ [N ].
2. Let I = (M, [N ], (di)i∈[N ]) ∈ I− be a non-positive
instance. Then we have 0 ≤ λI ≤ 2, and λI = 0 if
MmSNdi (M) = 0 for an i ∈ [N ].
Proof.
1. The inequality 23 ≤ λ
I is a result of the approxima-
tion algorithm presented by Procaccia and Wang [2014]
while the inequality λI ≤ ∞ is trivial. The equality
λI = ∞ holds if and only if the λ-max-min problem
for I has a solution for all λ ∈ R. This is equivalent to
MmSNui(M) = 0 for all i ∈ [N ].
2. The inequality λI ≥ 0 holds per definition while λI ≤
2 follows from the previous section. Finally, if there is
an agent i ∈ [N ] with MmSNdi (M) = 0 this implies
di ≡ 0 and therefore allocating all items to agent i gives
a solution of the 0-max-min problem for I .
We do not claim that the introduced bounds of 23 and 2
are tight. The proof of the lemma shows another difference
between MmS for goods and MmS for chores. If in the case
of chores, the MmS guarantee of an agent is 0, then the utility
function of this agent is equal to 0. The same result does not
hold true for goods.
Based on the previous notations, we define a new fairness
concept called optimal MmS, which is a natural variant of
MmS fairness.
Definition 6.3. For an instance I = (M, [N ], (vi)i∈[N ]) ∈
I, an optimal MmS allocation for I is an allocation
(S1, . . . , SN ) ∈ ΠN (M) with vi(Si) ≥ λI · MmSNvi (M)for all i ∈ [N ].
There are two main advantages to the introduced concept.
First, for each specific instance I ∈ I, we can guarantee the
existence of an optimal MmS allocation.3 Second, an opti-
mal Mms allocation is always an MmS allocation if the latter
exists. Both observations follow immediately from the defini-
tions. We will give an introductory example for optimal MmS
allocations both for goods and chores in the following.
Example 6.4. Define an instance I = (M, [2], (ui)i∈[2]) ∈
I+ with a set [2] = {1, 2} of two agents and a set of two items
M = {a, b}. We define u1(a) = r, u1(b) = 1, u2(a) = 1,
and u2(b) = r for some r > 1.
1. We have MmS2u1(M) = MmS
2
u2
(M) = 1 which
means that S1 = {b} and S2 = {a} is an MmS allo-
cation for I where each agent gets a total utility of 1.
The optimal MmS allocation for I would be S1 = {a}
and S2 = {b} giving each agent a total utility of r. In
particular, λI = r.
2. We have MmS2−u1(M) = MmS
2
−u2(M) = −r which
means that S1 = {a} and S2 = {b} is an MmS alloca-
tion for −I where each agent gets a total utility of −r.
The optimal MmS allocation for −I would be S1 = {b}
and S2 = {a} giving each agent a total utility of −1. In
particular, λ−I = 1
r
.
These examples also show that each agent’s ratio of the
utility in an optimal MmS allocation to the utility in an MmS
allocation can be arbitrarily large (for goods) or small (for
chores) as r > 1 can be any real number. Another natural
question is the worst case for the optimal MmS allocation in
comparison to the MmS guarantee. This is addressed by the
following definition.
Definition 6.5. 1. The universal MmS ratio for goods is
defined as λ+ := infI∈I+ λI .
2. The universal MmS ratio for chores is defined as λ− :=
supI∈I− λ
I .
We can give bounds for and connections between the
instance-dependent optimal and the instance-independent
universal MmS ratios.
Remark 6.6. Clearly, we have by definition λ+ ≤ λI for all
I ∈ I+ and λ− ≥ λI for all I ∈ I−. Furthermore, we have:
1. 23 ≤ λ
+ < 1 by Lemma 6.2 and the non-existence exam-
ple presented by Procaccia and Wang [2014].
2. 1 < λ− ≤ 2 by Prop. 4.4 and Lemma 6.2.
We presented some properties of optimal MmS allocations.
But since the complexity of computing an MmS allocation
for both goods and chores - if it exists - is strongly NP-hard
(Prop. 4.6), the same holds true for the computation of an
optimal MmS allocation. However, we will show in the next
3We have to set ∞ · 0 := 0 according to Lemma 6.2.
sections that there is a PTAS for the computation of such an
allocation as long as the number of agents is fixed.
7 Exact Algorithm and PTAS for Optimal
MmS Fairness (Chores)
In this section, we develop a PTAS for finding an optimal
MmS allocation for chores when the number of agents is
fixed. The PTAS is based on the following exact algorithm.
Algorithm 7.1. Given a non-negative instance
(M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) ∈ I
+
, we state an algorithm con-
sisting of the following steps.
1. Compute ci := mMSNui(M) for each agent i ∈ [N ].
2. Define new additive utility functions u′i :M→ R≥0 for
all i ∈ [N ] by
u′i(j) :=
1
ci
· ui(j) ∀j ∈ M
if ci > 0 and u′i :≡ 0 if ci = 0.
3. Solve the R/Cmax problem where each machine repre-
sents one agent and the processing times are defined as
pij := u
′
i(j) for all i ∈ [N ] and j ∈ M. Denote the
optimal objective function value by λ∗ and the corre-
sponding allocation by S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗N ) ∈ ΠN (M).
Proposition 7.2. Given a non-positive instance I =
(M, [N ], (di)i∈[N ]) ∈ I
−
. Execute algorithm 7.1 for the cor-
responding instance (M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) := −I ∈ I+. Then
we have λ∗ = λI and S∗ is an optimal MmS allocation for I .
Proof. We will show that λ∗ is the minimal λ ∈ [0,∞) for
which a solution to the perverse λ-min-max problem for −I
exists and S∗ is a corresponding solution. The claim follows
then with Prop. 4.3.
If ci = 0 (and therefore ui ≡ 0) for an agent i ∈ [N ],
we have λ∗ = 0 (because we can give all items to i) and
there is nothing to show. Let us now assume ci > 0 for all
i ∈ [N ]. λ∗ is by definition the minimal λ ≥ 0 for which
an allocation (S1, . . . , SN ) ∈ ΠN (M) with u′i(Si) ≤ λ
for all i ∈ [N ] exists. But this condition is equivalent to
ui(Si) ≤ λ · mMSNui(M) for all i ∈ [N ]. To sum up, λ
∗
is the minimal λ ≥ 0 for which a solution of the perverse
λ-min-max problem for −I exists and S∗ is a corresponding
solution.
There are two steps in algorithm 7.1 that are exponential
in time. First, each computation of mMSNui(M) may require
exponential time and second, finding an optimal solution to
R/Cmax may require exponential time. The computation of
mMSNui(M) for an agent i ∈ [N ] is equivalent to the com-
putation of a job partition that minimizes the makespan on N
identical parallel machines (P/Cmax) where the processing
time of a job j ∈M is defined as pj := ui(j).
Hochbaum and Shmoys [1987] present a PTAS for
P/Cmax and Lenstra et al. [1990] present a PTAS for
RN/Cmax (which means that the number of agents is fixed
to N ). This implies that we can run the following algorithm
in polynomial time when the number of agents is fixed and
therefore, it will be suitable to formulate a PTAS for the com-
putation of an optimal MmS allocation when the number of
agents is fixed.
Algorithm 7.3. Given a non-negative instance I =
(M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) ∈ I
+ and an ε > 0, we state an al-
gorithm consisting of the following steps.
1. Select α > 1 and β > 1 with αβ < 1 + ε.
2. Compute ci with mMSNui(M) ≤ ci ≤ α ·mMS
N
ui
(M)
for each agent i ∈ [N ].
3. Define new additive utility functions u′i :M→ R≥0 for
all i ∈ [N ] by
u′i(j) :=
1
ci
· ui(j) ∀j ∈ M
if ci > 0 and u′i :≡ 0 if ci = 0.
4. Consider the correspondingR/Cmax problem where the
processing times are defined as pij := u′i(j) for all i ∈
[N ] and j ∈ M. Denote the optimal objective function
value by λ∗. Compute an approximate solution Sε =
(Sε1 , . . . , S
ε
N ) ∈ ΠN (M) with u′i(Sεi ) ≤ βλ∗ for all
i ∈ [N ].
Theorem 7.4. Let a non-positive instance I =
(M, [N ], (di)i∈[N ]) ∈ I
−
, λ ≥ 0, and ε > 0 be given.
Assume that a solution of the λ-max-min problem for I exists
and execute Algorithm 7.3 for the pair (−I, ǫ). Then Sε is a
solution of the ((1 + ε) · λ)-max-min problem for I .
Proof. Let ui refer to −di for all i ∈ [N ]. Since a solution
of the λ-max-min problem for I exists, we can conclude by
4.3 that a solution of the perverse λ-min-max problem for−I
exists.
This implies the existence of (S1, . . . , SN ) ∈ ΠN (M)
with ui(Si) ≤ λ · mMSNui(M) ≤ λ · ci for all i ∈ [N ].
From this we have u′i(Si) ≤ λ for all i ∈ [N ] (note that
ci = 0 implies u′i ≡ 0) and we can conclude λ∗ ≤ λ.
Define [N ]>0 := {i ∈ [N ]|ci > 0}. This gives us
max
i∈[N ]>0
ui(S
ε
i )
ci
= max
i∈[N ]>0
u′i(S
ε
i ) ≤ βλ
∗ ≤ βλ.
Since ci ≤ α ·mMSNui(M), this leads us to
max
i∈[N ]>0
ui(S
ε
i )
mMSNui(M)
≤ αβλ ≤ (1 + ε) · λ
which is equivalent to
ui(S
ε
i ) ≤ (1 + ε) · λ ·mMS
N
ui
(M)
for all i ∈ [N ]>0 and the same is true for all i ∈ [N ]\[N ]>0
(since this means ui ≡ 0).
This proves that Sε is a solution of the perverse ((1+ε)·λ)-
min-max problem for−I . The result follows now by 4.3.
Since Algorithm 7.3 runs in polynomial time when the
number of agents is fixed, this general result gives us imme-
diately the following important corollary.
Corollary 7.5. Let the number of agents be fixed to N and
let I ∈ I− be a non-positive instance with N agents.
1. Executing algorithm 7.3 for −I and ε > 0 gives a PTAS
for the computation of an optimal MmS allocation for I .
2. If an MmS allocation for I exists, then executing algo-
rithm 7.3 for−I and ε > 0 gives a PTAS for the compu-
tation of an MmS allocation for I
Proof. Set λ = λI in 7.4 for the first result. The second state-
ment follows since each optimal MmS allocation for I is also
an MmS allocation for I if the latter exists.
This is a strong result since it gives a PTAS for the compu-
tation of an optimal MmS allocation of a given chore instance,
no matter if an MmS allocation exists or not (assuming the
number of agents is fixed). In addition, if an MmS allocation
for a chore instance exists, we have a PTAS (assuming the
number of agent is fixed) to compute an MmS allocation. An
analogous result for goods will be obtained in the next sec-
tion.
8 Exact Algorithm and PTAS for Optimal
MmS Fairness (Goods)
In this section, we present a PTAS for finding an optimal
MmS allocation for goods when the number of agents is fixed.
The PTAS is based on the following exact algorithm. The
techniques for the proofs are basically the same as in the pre-
vious section.
Algorithm 8.1. Given a non-negative instance
(M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) ∈ I
+
, we state an algorithm con-
sisting of the following steps.
1. Compute ci := MmSNui(M) for each agent i ∈ [N ] and
set
[N ]>0 := {i ∈ [N ]|ci > 0}.
2. If [N ]>0 = ∅, set λ∗ := ∞ and choose an arbitrary
allocation S∗ ∈ ΠN (M). Terminate the algorithm.
3. Define new additive utility functions
u′i :M→ R≥0, j 7→
1
ci
· ui(j)
for all i ∈ [N ]>0.
4. Solve the R/Cmin problem on |[N ]>0| machines where
each machine represents one agent i ∈ [N ]>0 and the
processing times are defined as pij := u′i(j) for all
i ∈ [N ]>0 and j ∈ M. Denote the optimal objective
function value by λ∗ and the corresponding allocation
by (S∗i )i∈[N ]>0 ∈ Π|[N ]>0|(M). Set S∗i := ∅ for all
i ∈ [N ]\[N ]>0 and S∗ := (S∗1 , . . . , S∗N ) ∈ ΠN (M).
Note that this algorithm aims at finding an optimal MmS
allocation by maximizing egalitarian welfare according to the
new utility functions u′i.
Proposition 8.2. Execute Algorithm 8.1 for a non-negative
instance I = (M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) ∈ I+. Then we have λ∗ =
λI and S∗ is an optimal MmS allocation for I .
There are again two steps in Algorithm 8.1 that are expo-
nential in time. First, each computation of MmSNui(M) may
require exponential time and second, finding an optimal solu-
tion to R/Cmin may require exponential time. The computa-
tion of MmSNui(M) for an agent i ∈ [N ] is equivalent to the
computation of a job partition that maximizes the minimum
finishing time on N identical parallel machines (P/Cmin)
where the processing time of a job j ∈ M is defined as
pj := ui(j).
Woeginger [1997] present a PTAS for P/Cmin and
Efraimidis and Spirakis [2006] present a PTAS forRN/Cmin
(which means that the number of agents is fixed to N ).4 This
implies that we can run the following algorithm in polynomial
time when the number of agents is fixed.
Algorithm 8.3. Given a non-negative instance I =
(M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) ∈ I
+ and an ε > 0, we state an al-
gorithm consisting of the following steps.
1. Select 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1 with αβ > 1− ε.
2. Compute ci with α ·MmSNui(M) ≤ ci ≤MmS
N
ui
(M)
for each agent i ∈ [N ]. Define a set [N ]>0 := {i ∈
[N ]|ci > 0}.
3. If [N ]>0 = ∅, set λ∗ := ∞ and choose an arbitrary
allocation Sε ∈ ΠN (M). Terminate the algorithm.
4. Define new additive utility functions
u′i :M→ R≥0, j 7→
1
ci
· ui(j)
for all i ∈ [N ]>0.
5. Consider the corresponding R/Cmin problem on |N>0|
machines where each machine represents one agent i ∈
[N ]>0 and the processing times are defined as pij :=
u′i(j) for all i ∈ [N ]>0 and j ∈ M. Denote the op-
timal objective function value by λ∗. Compute an ap-
proximate solution (Sεi )i∈[N ]>0 ∈ Π|[N ]>0|(M) with
u′i(S
ε
i ) ≥ βλ
∗ for all i ∈ [N ]>0. Set Sεi := ∅ for all
i ∈ [N ]\[N ]>0 and Sǫ := (S1, . . . , SN ) ∈ ΠN (M).
Theorem 8.4. Let a non-negative instance I =
(M, [N ], (ui)i∈[N ]) ∈ I
+
, λ ≥ 0, and ε > 0 be given.
Assume that a solution of the λ-max-min problem for I exists
and execute Algorithm 8.3 for the pair (I, ε). Then Sǫ is a
solution of the ((1− ε) · λ)-max-min problem for I .
Since Algorithm 8.3 runs in polynomial time when the
number of agents is fixed, this general result gives us the fol-
lowing important corollary.
Corollary 8.5. Let the number of agents be fixed to N and
let I ∈ I+ be a non-negative instance with N agents.
1. Algorithm 8.3 gives a PTAS for the computation of an
optimal MmS allocation for I .
2. If an MmS allocation for I exists, then Algorithm 8.3
gives a PTAS for the computation of an MmS allocation
for I .
9 Conclusions
We initiated work on MmS allocation of chores, proposed
a new fairness concept called optimal MmS, and presented
interesting connections and differences between fair alloca-
tion of goods and chores. For a fixed number of agents, we
proposed compelling approximation algorithms for fair allo-
cation with respect to MmS for both chores and goods. For
goods, we provided a connection between computation of
MmS allocations and egalitarian welfare maximizing alloca-
tions. There is much potential for further work on the fair
allocation of chores as this has largely been overlooked in
contrast to the case of goods. One interesting direction are
problems containing a mixture of goods and chores. For such
4A PTAS for each fixed number of agents implies also a PTAS
for each bounded number of at most N agents.
settings, an approximate MmS allocation will require approx-
imation guarantees on either side depending on whether the
MmS guarantee is positive or negative.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 4.4
The matrix O gets the following labeling:
α171+ α251− β121+ γ11∗α22− β222∗ γ32+ γ282−
α113∗
β03−
β213∗
γ233+


As Procaccia and Wang [2014] point out, each 4 elements
in O sum up to 55 if and only if they have a common la-
bel. Suppose agent 1 divides the items along the labels 1, 2, 3,
agent 2 divides the items along the labels α, β, γ and agent 3
divides the items along the labels +,−, ∗, then every agent
has perfectly balanced bundles where the utility is always
4, 055, 000. Therefore, we can conclude
mMS3u1(M) = mMS
3
u2
(M) = mMS3u3(M)
= 4, 055, 000.
Consider an arbitrary allocation (S1, S2, S3) ∈ Π3(M).
We will show that there is always an agent i ∈ [3] with
ui(Si) > 4, 055, 000 = mMS
3
ui
(M).
If there is an agent i ∈ [3] which receives at least five
items, we have ui(Si) > 5, 000, 000 > 4, 055, 000. Conse-
quently, we can focus on the case where each agent receives
exactly four items. If there is an agent i ∈ [3] which receives
items with a sum of more than 55 in the O-matrix, we have
ui(Si) > 4, 055, 096 > 4, 055, 000. Consequently, we can
focus on the case where all agents get a bundle with common
labels (i.e., with a sum of exactly 55 in the O-matrix).
If the items are divided along the labels 1, 2, 3 then agent 2
or agent 3 receive items labeled by 2 or 3 giving them a utility
of 4, 055, 001. If the items are divided along the labels α, β, γ
then agent 1 or agent 3 receive items labeled by β or γ giving
them a utility of at least 4, 055, 001. If the items are divided
along the labels +,−, ∗ then agent 1 or agent 2 receive items
labeled by − or ∗ giving them a utility of at least 4, 055, 001.
We showed that for an arbitrary allocation (S1, S2, S3) ∈
Π3(M) there is always an agent i ∈ [3] with ui(Si) >
4, 055, 000 = mMS3ui(M) which means that there is no per-
verse mMS allocation for the instance I . The result follows
from 4.2. 
B Proof of Proposition 4.5
We define
Si := {(i, k)|k = 1, 2, 3, 4}
for all i ∈ [3].
As pointed out in Appendix A, we can achieve a perfectly
balanced partition with
MmS3ui(M) = mMS
3
ui
(M) = 4, 055, 000
for all i ∈ [3]. Furthermore, we have u1(S1) = 4, 055, 000
and u2(S2) = u3(S3) = 4, 055, 001, which means
ui(Si) ≥MmS
3
ui
(M)
for all i ∈ [3] and therefore (S1, S2, S3) is an MmS allocation
for I. The non-existence of an MmS allocation for −I was
shown in 4.4.
The utility functions wi for each i ∈ [3] are defined by
wi((j, k)) := 10
6 · Bjk + 10
3 ·Ojk − E
i
jk.
This implies w1(S1) = 4, 055, 000 and w2(S2) =
w3(S3) = 4, 054, 999. As Procaccia and Wang [2014] point
out, we have mMS3wi(M) = 4, 055, 000 for all i ∈ [3],
which means that (S1, S2, S3) is a perverse mMS allocation
for J and therefore an MmS allocation for −J by 4.2. The
non-existence of an MmS allocation for J was shown by
Procaccia and Wang [2014]. 
C Proof of Proposition 4.6
We show the strong NP-hardness by a reduction from 3-
partition. We consider a setting with numbers N,W ∈ N,
a set M = {1, 2, . . . , 3N} of 3N elements, and an additive
valuation function u : M→ R>0 such that W4 < u(j) <
W
2
for all j = 1, . . . , 3N and
∑3N
j=1 u(j) = NW . Question: Can
M can be partitioned into N disjoint subsets where the total
valuation of the elements in each subset is W ? This decision
problem is a strongly NP-complete restricted version of the
3-partition problem [Garey and Johnson, 1979].
The computation of an MmS (resp. perverse mMS) alloca-
tion for the corresponding instance (M, [N ], (u)i∈[N ]) where
each agent has the same utility function u is equivalent to the
computation of an MmS (resp. perverse mMS) partition for
any single agent.
But this would answer the above mentioned strongly NP-
complete decision problem and therefore the computation of
an MmS allocation for both goods and chores (by 4.2) - if it
even exists - is strongly NP-hard.
Let us now fix the number of agents to 2. We consider a
number M ∈ N, a set {1, 2, . . . ,M} and an additive valu-
ation function u : M → R>0. Question: Can M can be
partitioned into 2 disjoint subsets where the total valuation of
the elements in both subsets is the same? This is a general in-
stance of the integer partition problem which is NP-complete
[Garey and Johnson, 1979].
The computation of an MmS (resp. perverse mMS) alloca-
tion for the corresponding instance (M, [2], (u)i∈[2]) where
both agents have the same utility function u is equivalent to
the computation of an MmS (resp. perverse mMS) partition
for any single agent.
But this would answer the NP-complete integer partition
decision problem and therefore the computation of an MmS
allocation for both goods and chores (by 4.2) - if it even exists
- is NP-hard for N = 2. 
D Proof of Proposition 8.2
If ci = 0 for all i ∈ [N ] then we have λ∗ = λI = ∞ by
6.2. So let us assume that ci > 0 for at least one i ∈ [N ]. By
construction,λ∗ is the maximal λ ≥ 0 for which an allocation
(Si)i∈[N ]>0 ∈ Π|N>0|(M) with u′i(Si) ≥ λ for all i ∈ [N ]>0
exists. If ci = 0 for an agent i ∈ [N ] then even
ui(∅) ≥ λ ·MmS
N
ui
(M)
holds true for all λ ∈ [0,∞).
In summary, λ∗ is the maximal λ ≥ 0 for which an alloca-
tion (Si)i∈[N ] ∈ ΠN (M) with ui(Si) ≥ λ ·MmSNui(M) for
all i ∈ [N ] exists and therefore λ∗ = λI . 
E Proof of theorem 8.4
If ci = 0 for all i ∈ [N ], there is nothing to show. So let
us assume [N ]>0 6= ∅. Since we know that a solution of the
λ-max-min problem for I exists, there must be an allocation
(S1, . . . , SN ) ∈ ΠN (M) with ui(Si) ≥ λ ·MmSNui(M) ≥
λ · ci for all i ∈ [N ]. From this, we have u′i(Si) ≥ λ for all
i ∈ [N ]>0, which implies λ ≤ λ∗.
Therefore, we have
min
i∈[N ]>0
ui(S
ε
i )
ci
= min
i∈[N ]>0
u′i(S
ε
i ) ≥ βλ
∗ ≥ βλ.
Since ci ≥ α ·mMSNui(M) for all i ∈ [N ], this leads us to
min
i∈[N ]>0
ui(S
ε
i )
MmSNui(M)
≥ αβλ ≥ (1− ε) · λ.
But this means nothing else than
ui(S
ε
i ) ≥ (1 − ε) · λ ·MmS
N
ui
(M)
for all i ∈ [N ]>0 which holds clearly also for i ∈ [N ]\[N ]>0.

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